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MCINTYRE V. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N: "A WHOLE NEW 
BOUTIQUE OF WONDERFUL FIRST AMENDMENT 
LITIGATION OPENS ITS DOORS"1  
by  
MARK A. WHITT  
Please ask for a name to be placed next to the source so I can get mad at the guy who's 
doing this. It's strange out there. It's strange.2  
President George Bush
I. INTRODUCTION  
In Alabama, rogue campaign operatives mount an offensive against a competitor by 
mailing anonymous fliers to the opponent's financial contributors.3 In New Orleans, an 
aid to a front-running mayoral candidate distributes anonymous fliers alleging that an 
opponent has fathered several illegitimate children, is a bisexual, uses drugs, surrounds 
himself with drug dealers, and receives kickbacks.4 Anonymous handouts in Los Angeles 
describe the leader of a political monitoring group as a "bitter man-hating bitch," while 
another member is referred to as a "former poster child for birth control who starts the 
day by pouring Jack Daniels over her breakfast."5 In Conejo Valley, California, an 
anonymous mailer describes a local council member as a "proven pervert."6 Most states 
have laws designed to curb such electoral antics.7 However, a recent United States 
Supreme Court ruling calls these laws into serious question on First Amendment 
grounds.8  
Disclosure statutes are not a modern legislative invention.9 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission,10 the Court was asked to determine the validity of such statutes, which 
attempt to regulate the dissemination of anonymous political literature. "The most 
common explanations given for these statutes are that they deter fraud and libel in the 
election arena and that they provide valuable information to the voters."11 In McIntyre, 
the Court addressed whether an Ohio statute,12 banning the distribution of anonymous 
campaign literature by a private citizen, violates the First Amendment right to free 
speech.13 In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment encompasses the 
right to publish and distribute anonymous political literature.14  
This Note analyzes the Court's decision in McIntyre. Part II defines the issue presented in 
the case and provides a general background on disclosure statutes, with particular 
attention drawn to the Supreme Court's decision in Talley v. California.15 A brief 
discussion of various state court decisions post-Talley is also provided.16 The Statement 
of the Case in Part III presents the facts, procedural history and holding of the case.17 Part 
IV analyzes the Court's holding.18  
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This Note disagrees with the Court's holding for three reasons. First, it argues that the 
Court misinterpreted the history of anonymous political speech and engaged in circular 
reasoning by assuming that, because the Framers of the Constitution published 
anonymously, the Constitution must be meant to protect anonymous speech.19 Second, 
the Court should not have subjected Ohio's disclosure statute to the strict scrutiny 
standard of review, because the statute at issue does not severely restrict First 
Amendment rights.20 Third, assuming arguendo that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard of review, the Court should have acknowledged that Ohio's disclosure statute 
was narrowly tailored to address the compelling state interests of providing the electorate 
with relevant information, and identifying those responsible for fraud and libel.21  
II. BACKGROUND  
McIntyre evidences a clash between competing constitutional principles. On the one hand 
is the general acknowledgment of a state's interest in regulating elections.22 On the other 
is an individual's right to freely speak and publish on matters of public concern.23 
"Balancing"24 these rights became the central concern of the McIntyre Court.  
The issue of whether courts should afford anonymous speech a protected status under the 
First Amendment was not one of first impression for the Court.25 In Talley v. California, 
the Court struck down a Los Angeles City ordinance that placed a wholesale ban on all 
forms of anonymous handbilling.26 Supporters of the law cited the government interest in 
preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel as sufficient state interests outweighing any 
alleged First Amendment claim of individuals.27 However, the Court found the sweeping 
language of the ordinance to be overbroad and struck it down as violative of the First 
Amendment right to free speech.28  
Justice Black, a seminal First Amendment absolutist,29 authored the opinion of the Court. 
His opinion provides a historical narrative of anonymous political speech in the United 
States, within the context of government abuses against political dissidents. Courts have 
cited his strong language in support of a "right to anonymity" repeatedly 30 in similar 
cases since Talley. Justice Black stated:  
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an 
important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects 
from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive 
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all. The obnoxious press 
licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was 
due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, 
writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature critical of 
the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths 
to which government had to go to find out who was responsible for books 
that were obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried, 
and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get evidence to 
convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in 
England. Two Puritan ministers, John Perry and John Udal, were 
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sentenced to death on charges that they were responsible for writing, 
printing, or publishing books. Before the Revolutionary War colonial 
patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of 
literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by 
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were 
written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the 
Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, 
were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has 
sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.31 
To the extent that Justice Black's opinion recognized a "right to remain anonymous," the 
Court did not fully define the parameters of this new "right." By an express disclaimer,32 
the Court left open the question of whether a more narrowly tailored law directed toward 
advancing an identifiable state interest might pass constitutional scrutiny.33  
Other members of the Talley court were not as enthusiastic about Justice Black's 
endorsement of the right to remain anonymous. Justice Harlan, concurring, utilized a 
balancing approach and found the scales tipped in favor of free speech because of the 
expansiveness of the statute.34 Dissenting Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker, 
flatly rejected the majority approach. "I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right 
of free speech but not his freedom of anonymity. The Constitution says nothing about 
anonymous speech."35  
Despite the Talley court's admonition against silencing speech simply because it is 
anonymous, most states continued to regulate the dissemination of anonymous political 
literature.36 In light of the "disclaimer" in Talley, courts in many states reasoned that 
more narrowly defined laws could survive the "exacting scrutiny"37 required of legislative 
prohibitions directed at speech on public issues and elections, as opposed to a general ban 
on all anonymous literature.38 Other states have been less prone to utilize the Talley 
disclaimer and have embraced the broad holding of the case to invalidate disclosure 
requirements.39  
The federal government also maintains a disclosure statute.40 Unlike many of the broad 
statutes found invalid in state courts,41 the federal statute limits disclosure to instances in 
which "Any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . ."42 The 
limitation of the statute to candidates not issues, referenda, and the like has apparently 
been sufficient to sustain the federal disclosure requirement.43  
The conflict among jurisdictions in applying Talley to more narrowly drawn statutes 
made the issue of anonymous political speech ripe for review. Of course, Margaret 
McItyre was likely impervious to this when she mounted her campaign against a school 
tax levy.  
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
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A. Facts  
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets 44 expressing her opposition to 
a proposed school tax levy to persons attending a public meeting at Blendon Middle 
School in Westerville, Ohio.45 At this meeting, the superintendent of schools planned to 
discuss an upcoming referendum on a school tax levy.46 Mrs. McIntyre produced the 
leaflets on her home computer and gave them to a printer to make additional copies.47 
They were signed "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers."48 Mrs. McIntyre, her son, and her 
son's friend placed the flyers on car windshields in the school parking lot.49  
While Mrs. McIntyre distributed her leaflets, an official of the school district informed 
her that the unsigned 50 leaflets did not conform to the Ohio elections laws.51 Mrs. 
McIntyre appeared at another meeting the next evening and handed out more of the 
flyers.52  
The tax levy that Mrs. McIntyre campaigned against failed twice, but passed on its third 
attempt in November of 1988.53 Five months later, the same school official that had 
admonished Mrs. McIntyre about the improprieties of her literature filed a complaint with 
the Ohio Elections Commission.54  
B. Procedure  
At the hearing before the Ohio Elections Commission, Mrs. McIntyre was charged with 
violating O.R.C. 3599.09(A),55 which requires any written communication "designed to 
promote . . . the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in an 
election,"56 be identified with the name and address of the person who "issues, makes, or 
is responsible"57 for the communication. The Ohio Elections Commission found Mrs. 
McIntyre in violation of the statute and imposed a $100 fine.58  
Mrs. McIntyre instituted an appeal of the decision of the Ohio Elections Commission 
with the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.59 The common pleas court reversed the 
finding of the Elections Commission, holding that O.R.C. § 3599.09(A) was 
unconstitutional as applied.60 The State appealed, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
of Ohio reversed the trial court.61 The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court of Ohio 
on a motion to certify the record.62 The Supreme Court of Ohio found the statute 
constitutional and upheld the original finding of the Ohio Elections Commission, with 
Justice Craig Wright casting the lone dissenting vote.63  
The Ohio Supreme Court reached its decision in a bifurcated fashion. First, the court 
relied on Anderson v. Celebrezze 64 for the proposition that strict scrutiny does not apply 
to regulations governing elections,65 and that O.R.C. 3599.09 imposed only a "minor 
requirement"66 on would-be anonymous publishers. Second, the Court determined that 
the Ohio statute was more narrowly tailored than the ordinance involved in Talley, and 
was thus permissible.67  
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Undeterred by the decisions of the Ohio courts, McIntyre petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.68 The Court granted certiorari, but Mrs. 
McIntyre died during the briefing of the case.69  
C. Holding  
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Majority found the Ohio statute to be in 
derogation of the First Amendment.70 First, the Court held that Ohio erred by adopting 
the relaxed standard of review set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze.71 Next, in applying 
strict scrutiny, the Court determined that providing relevant information to voters was not 
sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions imposed by the statute.72 The Court did 
find that a state has a compelling interest in preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel, 
but concluded that Ohio's disclosure statute was not narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest.73 The Majority embroidered its opinion with references to historic figures who 
engaged in anonymous political activity, a factor which seemed to weigh heavily in the 
Court's reasoning.74  
Justice Ginsberg filed a concurring opinion,75 while Justice Thomas filed a separate 
opinion concurring in the judgment.76 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a 
spirited dissenting opinion.77  
IV. ANALYSIS  
The Supreme Court in McIntyre failed to take into account several factors that should 
have changed the outcome of its decision. First, the Court misinterpreted the "honorable 
tradition"78 of anonymous pamphleteering.79 Second, the Court should have subjected the 
Ohio statute to the standard of review articulated in Anderson instead of strict scrutiny.80 
Third, even assuming that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, Ohio's 
compelling interests in maintaining a disclosure statute outweigh the comparatively 
minor burdens imposed on free speech rights.81  
A. The Anonymous Framers  
McIntyre secures the "right to remain anonymous" for those who wish to promote their 
views in such a manner, largely due to the Court's analysis of anonymous political 
activity carried out during our nation's founding.82 However, the Court did not fully 
explore why these authors found it necessary to publish anonymously, nor did it explain 
whether any legitimate reasons for anonymity as they existed two centuries ago are still 
applicable today.  
The McIntyre Court hurriedly embraced Justice Black's famous passage in Talley to 
explore the tradition of anonymous pamphleteering.83 From the overall theme of Justice 
Black's narrative in Talley, essentially one reason for safeguarding anonymous speech 
can be identified.84 Simply, anonymous speech allows persons to speak their mind about 
the government without fear of reprisal.85 The Petitioner's argument in McIntyre suggests 
that, because some of the Framers published anonymously prior to ratification of the 
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Constitution, and other public figures have done so since, one must understand the First 
Amendment to prohibit any government restrictions on anonymous speech.86  
The Petitioner's argument rests on a false syllogism.87 Petitioners argument is 
diagrammed as follows:  
Question: Is anonymous political speech constitutionally protected? 
Minor Premise: The Framers drafted the Constitution.  
Major Premise: The Framers utilized anonymous political speech. 
Conclusion: Anonymous speech is constitutional. 
However, anonymous writings did not occupy some mystical status during ratification. 
"Although the use of pseudonyms was commonplace during the debate that preceded 
ratification of the Constitution, it became a 'hotly contested' issue, as Federalist and Anti-
Federalist editors debated the continuing necessity of this practice and its practical impact 
on the character of public debate over ratification."88 This concern led many newspaper 
editors to require that authors disclose their identity, out of the concern that anonymous 
or secret publication could be used to conceal the authors' true motives when attempting 
to influence public opinion."89 The fact that some of the Framers may have engaged in 
anonymous political activity does not establish that it is a constitutional right.90  
Obviously, the Framers did not enjoy the benefits of First Amendment protection during 
the Revolutionary Era, when they spoke out against abuses inflicted by the English 
Crown, because the Constitution did not yet exist.91 Passage of the First Amendment 
offered some protection, but it did not fully alleviate their concerns. "Development of 
national political factions and partisan newspapers during the 1790s provided the 
backdrop for fierce debates over the proper limitations on political speech and for more 
frequent use of political libel prosecutions."92 It was this fear of widespread political 
criticism that led the Federalist to pass the Sedition Act of 1798.93  
The chief threat against those that published anonymously during the late 1700s no 
longer exists today. First, there is no longer a fear of reprisal by the English Crown or any 
other government for that matter. The First Amendment alleviates that concern.94 Second, 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence rejects the validity of the Sedition Act the 
remaining obstacle to free speech after passage of the First Amendment.95 Finally, the 
Majority of the McIntyre Court conspicuously ignored the fact that Mrs. McIntyre never 
attempted to remain anonymous, nor did she ever fear retaliation for expressing her 
views.96  
B. The Standard of Review  
The McIntyre Court applied strict scrutiny to Ohio's disclosure statute.97 A more 
appropriate standard would have been the test enunciated in Anderson.98 The Anderson 
standard is essentially a balancing approach.99 It rejects "Any litmus-paper test that will 
separate valid from invalid restrictions,"100 and requires a statute to be narrowly drawn to 
advance a compelling interest only when the alleged restriction of First Amendment 
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rights are "severe."101 "When a state election law provision imposes only reasonable non-
discriminatory restrictions upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state's 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions."102  
Under the Anderson test, Ohio's statute would clearly be constitutionally permissible. 
Ohio's disclosure statute does not impose a "severe" restriction on speech because 
requiring a person to place his or her name on a publication he or she has authored does 
not "severely restrict" the ability to publish. It only requires that the speaker identify 
himself on the communication.103 Although the disclosure statute regulates the form of 
the message in limited circumstances,104 it does not regulate its substance. Thus, the 
restriction is reasonable and non-discriminatory.  
The Court rejected the Anderson test, however, reasoning that Ohio's disclosure 
regulation does more than control the mechanics of the voting process.105 The Court 
viewed the disclosure requirement as a content-based regulation of political speech 
subject to strict scrutiny,106 because "Only those publications containing speech designed 
to influence voters in an election need bear the required markings."107  
C. The Court Ignored Ohio's Compelling State Interests  
Even when subjected to strict scrutiny, the Court should have upheld Ohio's disclosure 
statute. The regulation of the electoral process is a compelling state interest.108 When this 
interest is balanced against the minimal intrusion on First Amendment rights occasioned 
by a mandatory disclosure statute, the state interest outweighs any asserted right to 
anonymous speech.109 Moreover, the disclosure statute has a "rational basis" because it is 
causally related to the advancement of compelling state interests.110 Disclosure ensures 
that the electorate receives only relevant information and, without it, there is no way to 
identify those who engage in fraud, false authority, and libel. There are no less intrusive 
means available for the state to advance its interests in an adequate manner.111  
1. Providing the Electorate With Relevant Information 
The Court summarily dismissed Ohio's interests in providing the electorate with relevant 
information as a compelling interest justifying disclosure.112 This holding seems to 
conflict with the Court's precedent with respect to disclosure requirements in other 
contexts.113  
The goal of providing the electorate with relevant information is to promote rational 
electoral outcomes.114 Rational government is a necessary - precondition for the 
attainment and preservation of any right. "To place freedom of speech above the 
rationality of government itself is to ignore the fact that only through intelligent self-
government are any freedoms, including freedom of speech, secured."115  
There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence concerning the absurdity of anonymous smear 
campaigns, which disclosure statutes seek to regulate.116 Scholars, journalists, and even 
politicians have long lamented over the "cheapening" of modern elections.117 Their 
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discontent is evidenced by the dearth of legislation designed to combat "gutter 
politics."118 "Such a universal and long established American legislative practice must be 
given precedence, I think, over historical and academic speculation regarding a restriction 
that assuredly does not go to the heart of free speech."119  
2. Identifying Persons Who Engage in False Advertising and Libel 
The McIntyre Court agreed that Ohio had a compelling state interest in preventing fraud 
and libel.120 Nonetheless, the Court determined that Ohio's disclosure statute was not 
narrowly tailored to effectuate its purpose, because legitimate activities fall within the 
prohibitions outlined in the statute.121 However, the Court goes on to state: "We 
recognize that a State's enforce ment interest might justify a more limited identification 
requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafleting at issue here."122  
The Court's holding produces a troubling result. On the one hand, the Court recognizes 
that a state has a compelling interest in preventing fraud, false advertising and libel.123 
This interest having been established, a state should be permitted to promulgate 
legislation in furtherance of that interest.124 The McIntyre decision prevents a state from 
doing so. These laws are meant to be complementary, and to prohibit operation of the 
former undermines the latter.125 Persons who are libeled thus have no recourse against the 
perpetrators because there is no way of identifying them.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The McIntyre Court was presented with the issue of whether it is constitutionally 
permissible for a state to prohibit the anonymous communication of political speech 
within the context of a statute governing elections. The Court should have applied the 
standard of review articulated in Anderson and its progeny to uphold Ohio's disclosure 
statute as a reasonable means of addressing a compelling state interest. Moreover, the 
method chosen to effectuate those interests the disclosure statute only minimally affects 
free speech rights.126 Instead, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found no compelling 
state interest to justify such a "severe restriction" on speech.127  
Even when strict scrutiny is applied to Ohio's disclosure statute, compelling state interests 
are served by mandatory disclosure. 128 First, the state has a compelling interest in 
providing the electorate with relevant information about candidates and issues.129 This 
serves the legitimate end of promoting rational electoral outcomes. Second, the State has 
an interest in preventing fraud and libel, and should have a means of identifying 
perpetrators.130 Otherwise, enforcement of prohibitions against disseminating false or 
mislead ing information is ineffective.  
The parameters of the "right to remain anonymous" will only be ascertained by continued 
litigation in this field.131 Fortunately, the life tenure of Supreme Court Justices assures 
that at least they will never be on the receiving end of negative, anonymous election 
tactics.  
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1. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1535 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
2. John E. Yang, Anonymous Sources Come Home to Roost, WASH. POST., Mar. 13, 
1992, at A-23. An exasperated President Bush made this plea during a news conference, 
where he chastised the media's practice of quoting anonymous sources.  
3. Kevin Sullivan, Kid Gloves Come Off in Montgomery, WASH. POST., Mar. 25, 1994, at 
C1.  
4. Kenneth J. Cooper, Negative Themes Dominate Contest in New Orleans, WASH. POST. 
, Feb. 5, 1994, at A8.  
5. Barry M. Horstman, Flyer Uses Vulgarity to Attack GOP Group , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 1992, at Metro 6.  
6 T.W. McGarry, Schaefer, Stratton Gail Leads in Local Races, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
1986, at Metro 6.  
7. See Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First 
Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 145 n.8 (1995) (listing the disclosure statutes of 
48 states); but see infra note 35 (noting disagreement about the exact number of states 
that continue to maintain disclosure statutes). Distinguishing and classifying the 
disclosure statutes of various states is not addressed in this Note. For such distinction, see 
King, supra.  
8. The First Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("The freedom of speech and of the press, 
which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are 
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by 
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.").  
9. Ohio adopted its first disclosure statute in 1915. Act of May 27, 1915, 1915 Ohio Leg. 
Acts 350. See State v. Babst, 135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922) (disclosure statute upheld as 
neutral and regulatory). By the end of World War I, 24 states had similar laws. See 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1533 n.1 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). For a discussion of disclosure statutes written on the eve of McIntyre, see 
King, supra note 7. King's Comment outlines the disparity among state courts in 
resolving the issue presented in this Note. For specific cases discussing disclosure 
statutes, see John C. Williams, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute 
Prohibiting Anonymous Political Advertising, 4 A.L.R.4th 741. See also infra notes 38-
39.  
10. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). McIntyre is yet another watershed case in First Amendment 
jurisprudence originating from Ohio. See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(Cincinnati, Ohio); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Canton, Ohio).  
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11. King, supra note 7, at 144.  
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988) (statute reproduced infra 
note 55) amended and renumbered by 1995 Ohio Legis. 60 (H.B.99) (renumbered as 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.20).  
13. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of people peaceably to assemble . . . ." US 
CONST. amend. I.  
14. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516-17.  
15. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.  
16. See infra Part II, notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.  
17. See infra Part III (A), (B) and (C).  
18. See infra Part IV (A), (B) and (C).  
19. See infra Part IV (A).  
20. See infra Part IV (B).  
21. See infra Part IV (C) (1) and (2).  
22. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 
(1989) (states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of the 
elections process).  
23. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues 
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system 
of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression . . . .").  
24. "Balancing" the rights of individuals against the asserted interests of states is a 
common feature of first amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 373 (1927) ("[A]lthough the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, 
they are not in their nature absolute."), overruled by, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) ("[A]lthough . . . absolute."). However, First Amendment purists, such as Justice 
Black, have rejected any notion of "balancing" First Amendment rights against an 
asserted state interest:  
As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that 
[balancing] doctrine for I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal 
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command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and 
assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 
'balancing' that was to be done in this field. 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See 
also MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO 
BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 90-209 (1984) (discussing 
Justice Black's judicial philosophy); Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
865 (1960). Justice Black's philosophy with regard to the First Amendment has never 
been widely held by other members of the Court. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, An 
Absolutism that Works: Reviving the Original "Clear and Present Danger" Test, 1983 S. 
Ill. U. L.J. 127 (1983) (discussing Justice Black's philosophy concerning the First 
Amendment as a minority viewpoint).  
25. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (discussed infra notes 26-35 and 
accompanying text).  
26. Id. (statute "at issue" was not limited to political advertising, but covered all written 
communications).  
27. Id. at 64.  
28. Id.  
29. See supra note 24.  
30. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Insco, 
365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 
1974); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 
1976); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978) (each case 
involving a challenge to disclosure requirements on campaign literature).  
31. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64, 65 (citations and footnotes omitted). For similar impassioned 
views, see People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("Anonymity 
has been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory 
power of the establishment and, whether their fears of reprisal were justified or not, 
encouraging them to express unpopular views. Anonymous writings have an honored 
place in our political heritage."); North Dakota Educ. Ass'n , 262 N.W.2d at 735 ("It is 
worth remembering that among the glories of our nation's history are documents written 
under pseudonyms by men who were to become the second, third and fourth Presidents, 
the first Chief Justice and the first Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State of the 
United States.").  
32. State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tenn. 1982) (upholding Tennessee disclosure 
statute based upon the "express disclaimer" of the Talley Court). See infra note 33.  
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33. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64 ("Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a 
way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance 
is in no manner so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative history indicating 
such a purpose. Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to 
prevent these or any other supposed evils.") (emphasis added). Courts that have upheld 
disclosure statutes in the wake of Talley have cited this passage as a means of 
distinguishing their "narrow" statutes with the "broad" one at issue in Talley. See infra 
note 38.  
One might be left puzzled as to why Justice Black did not seize upon the opportunity in 
Talley to invalidate all disclosure laws regardless of any asserted state interest based 
upon his literal interpretation of the First Amendment's language that "Congress shall 
make no law. . . ." See supra note 24. Might Justice Black have been worried that without 
the "disclaimer," he would not be able to command a majority to sign on to his opinion? 
For a discussion of interpersonal relationships of justices and the "politics" of the 
Supreme Court, see CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-8, 
155-68 (1992).  
34. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also supra 
note 26 (ordinance encompassed all types of speech, political or otherwise).  
35. Id. at 70 (Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).  
36. The exact number of states with disclosure statutes is somewhat disputed. One article 
places the figure at 43 states. Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1111, 1286-92 (1975). Another author recently placed the figure at 48. King, supra note 
7, at n.8 (listing the citations to disclosure statutes in 48 states). Still another author 
asserts that only fourteen states maintain disclosure statutes. Steven Robert Daniels, 
Survey of Developments in North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit, 1993, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 1618, 1624 (1994). The source of confusion probably arises from the fact that 
disclosure statutes vary widely in their scope and application. See King, supra note 7, at 
146-50 (categorizing disclosure statutes based on four criteria: (1) The type of writing 
regulated; (2) The type of disclosure required; (3) Whether disclosure is linked to the 
writing itself or to an expenditure disclosure; or (4) Determining who is made criminally 
liable for failing to disclose the publisher or disseminator.)  
37. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) ("When a law 
burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction 
only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest."). But see infra notes 
99-107 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court should only apply strict scrutiny 
when first amendment rights are severely restricted, or where a governmental prohibition 
directed at speech is content-based and discriminates as to the views of the speaker, i.e., 
the restriction is not viewpoint-neutral).  
38. See, e.g. United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Messerli v. 
State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 12 Cal. Rptr. 
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2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), superceded by, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, aff'd, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
659, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794; Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1976); 
State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1993); State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 
1982). In each of these cases, the courts concluded that the disclosure statutes under 
review were drawn sufficiently narrow in furtherance of compelling governmental 
interests, as opposed to the broad ordinance involved in Talley.  
39. See, e.g., Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (mandatory disclosure of identity of person or 
organization responsible for production of campaign literature violates First 
Amendment); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974) (proposed statute 
requiring mandatory disclosure of author's name in newspaper editorial would violate 
First Amendment); State v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195, 200 (Idaho 1968) (disclosure statute 
found void for vagueness); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987) (mandatory 
disclosure violates First Amendment); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976) 
(declaring unconstitutional a disclosure statute requiring political literature to bear the 
name of its author); accord State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989); Commonwealth 
v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975) (distributing anonymous circulars protected by 
First Amendment); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978); 
People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (disclosure statute 
unconstitutionally limits free speech).  
40. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1988).  
41. See supra note 38.  
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1988).  
43. See United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1973). ("The 
ordinance [in Talley] was a broad one barring distribution of any handbills in any place, 
under any circumstances, without an attribution statement. Section 612, on the other 
hand, applies only to statements relating to or concerning a candidate . . . . That statute is 
therefore limited in its coverage to requiring fairness in federal elections and does not 
preclude anonymous criticism of oppressive practices and laws as referred to by the 
majority in Talley . . . ."). The Court's reference to § 612 is the predecessor statute to 2 
U.S.C. § 441d (1988).  
44. A photocopy of one of Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets is reproduced at McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1514 n.2. The main text of the flyer reads in 
substantially the same form as below:  
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new buildings 
and expansion programs. We gave them what they asked. We knew there 
was [sic] crowded conditions and new growth in the district.  
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit - WHY?  
13
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We are told the three middle schools must be split because of over-
crowding, and yet we are told 3 schools are being closed - WHY?  
A magnet school is not a full [sic] operating school, but a specials [sic] 
school. 
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help 
formulate the new boundaries. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard and 
came up with a very workable plan. Their plan was totally disregarded - 
WHY?  
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education 
and welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE 
TOLERATED.  
PLEASE VOTE NO  
ISSUE 19  
 THANK YOU CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS 
45. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. The April 27th meeting marked the beginning of a long 
and unpleasant battle over the tax levy in Westerville. See Hansen v. Westerville City 
Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), cert. denied 
115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). Mrs. McIntyre and several other individuals subsequently formed 
a group called "Citizens Against Tax Waste" (CATW). Id. At a public meeting over the 
tax levy in September, 1988, the local police ejected one of the members of this 
organization for commandeering the meeting. Id. At a meeting in October, the police 
ejected another member of CATW and charged him with resisting arrest. Id. At the same 
meeting, police forcibly escorted several other individuals from the meeting. Id. Twelve 
members of CATW, including Mrs. McIntyre, eventually sued the school board and the 
police in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The only claims to survive 
summary judgment were those alleging that CATW members were impermissibly barred 
from public meetings at the school. Id.  
46. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.  
47. Id.  
48. This was a fictitious organization. See Brief of Respondent at 1, McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (No. 93-986) [hereinafter "Brief for 
Respondent"] See also supra note 45 (reference to "Citizens Against Tax Waste").  
49. 115 S. Ct. at 1514.  
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50. Some of the leaflets were in fact signed by Mrs. McIntyre. Apparently, Mrs. McIntyre 
intended to sign all of the flyers but failed to do so. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 
48, at 1.  
51. 115 S. Ct. at 1514. See also infra note 55 (text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988)).  
52. 115 S. Ct. at 1514.  
53. Id. See also supra note 45 (describing the feud over the tax levy).  
54. 115 S. Ct. at 1544.  
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988) provides:  
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written, 
printed, posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, 
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed 
to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate or to 
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in 
any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of financing political 
communications through newspapers, magazines, outdoor advertising 
facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of general public political 
advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed 
matter, unless there appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous 
place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or 
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the 
organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is 
responsible therefor. The disclaimer 'paid political advertisement' is not 
sufficient to meet the requirements of this division. When such publication 
is issued by the regularly constituted central or executive committee of a 
political party, organized as provided in Chapter 3517 of the Revised 
Code, it shall be sufficiently identified if it bears the name of the 
committee and its chairman or treasurer. No person, firm, or corporation 
shall print or reproduce any notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample 
ballot, or any other form of publication in violation of this section. This 
section does not apply to the transmittal of personal correspondence that is 
not reproduced by machine for general distribution.  
The secretary of state may, by rule, exempt, from the requirements of this 
division, printed matter and certain other kinds of printed communications 
such as campaign buttons, balloons, pencils, or like items, the size or 
nature of which makes it unreasonable to add an identification or 
disclaimer. The disclaimer or identification, when paid for by a campaign 
committee, shall be identified by the words 'paid for by' followed by the 
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name and address of the campaign committee and the appropriate officer 
of the committee, identified by name and title. 
O.R.C. 3599.09 was amended and re-codified at O.R.C. 3517.20. See LEXIS, OH-LEGIS 
60 (H.B. 99)(eff. Aug. 22, 1995). The revised statute limits the attribution statement to 
candidates, campaign committees, legislative campaign funds, or other entities. Id.  
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).  
57. Id.  
58. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. Mrs. McIntyre was not beaten or pilloried as was John 
Lilburn in the example cited by Justice Black in Talley v. California. See supra note 31 
and accompanying text (explaining the fate of John Lilburn for distributing prohibited 
books). The Ohio Elections Commission could have taken one of any of the following 
courses of action: (1) Imposed a fine of up to $1,000; (2) Reported its findings to the 
appropriate prosecuting authority for civil or criminal prosecution; or (3) Entered a 
finding that good cause has been shown not to impose a fine or refer the matter to the 
prosecuting authority. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(C)(1-3) (Anderson 1988). 
The Court did not mention subsection (C)(3) in its opinion. This provision provides a 
"safety valve" that should have been sufficient to uphold the statute in its general 
application. See infra note 105 (explaining that the Court has allowed special exemptions 
from other types of disclosure laws for certain groups, without invalidating the law in its 
general application).  
59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 90AP-1221, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951, 
aff'd, 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).  
60. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152, rev'd 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).  
61. McIntyre, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951.  
62. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152, rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).  
63. Id. at 156 (Wright, J., dissenting). Justice Wright stated:  
[I] do not agree with the majority that R.C. 3599.09(A) imposes a 'minor 
requirement' that 'persons producing campaign literature identify 
themselves as the source therefor,' nor do I agree that this requirement 
'neither impacts the content of their message nor significantly burdens 
their ability to have it disseminated.' I am sure that Publius and Cato 
would have strenuously disagreed with the majority as well. 
Id.  
64. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See also infra note 99 (explaining the Anderson test).  
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65. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154-55, (citing Byrdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992)). 
("[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation 
be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of 
states seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.").  
66. Id. at 155. ("The minor requirement imposed by R.C. 3599.09 that those persons 
producing campaign literature identify themselves as the source thereof neither impacts 
the content of their message nor significantly burdens their ability to have it 
disseminated."). This reasoning is also relevant to the issue of whether the statute was 
content based. See infra notes 104-5.  
67. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154 ("In contrast to the ordinance in Talley, [Ohio] can 
legitimately claim that R.C. 3599.09 has as its purpose the identification of persons who 
distribute materials containing false statements . . . . Accordingly, unlike Talley, the 
disclosure requirement is clearly meant to 'identify those responsible for fraud, false 
advertising and libel.'").  
68. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 1047, motion to dismiss denied, 114 
S. Ct. 2670 (1994).  
69. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2670, 2670 (1994).  
70. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516-24 (1995). Perhaps this is 
to state the matter too tactfully. The last line of the Court's opinion paraphrases Ohio's 
disclosure statute as follows: "One would be hard pressed to think of a better example of 
the pitfalls of Ohio's blunderbuss approach than the facts of the case before us." Id. at 
1524. Has "Nino" finally rubbed off on the Majority? See Stuart Taylor Jr., Season of 
Snarling Justices, AKRON BEACON J., Apr. 5, 1990, at A11 (describing Justice Scalia's 
confrontational style with other justices of the Court). See also Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even Justice Scalia's allies have not escaped his wrath. 
See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (chastising Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy for not 
explicitly overruling Roe v. Wade).  
71. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 ("[T]his case 'involves a limitation on political 
expression subject to exacting scrutiny.'" (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 
(1988)). "[T]he category of speech regulated by the Ohio statute occupies the core of the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment." Id.  
72. Id. at 1520 ("The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant 
information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or 
disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in the case of a handbill written by a 
private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author adds 
little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.").  
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73. See id. at 1520-21. The Court stated:  
Ohio's prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal 
weapon against fraud. Rather, it serves as an aid to enforcement of the 
specific prohibitions and as a deterrent to the making of false statements 
by unscrupulous prevaricators. Although these ancillary benefits are 
assuredly legitimate, we are not persuaded that they justify 3599.09(A)'s 
extremely broad prohibition. 
74. See id. at 1524 ("Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent."). 
"Great works of literature have frequently been produced by authors writing under 
assumed names." Id. at 1516; but see id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I can imagine 
no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an 
anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter."). See also id. at 1516 n.4, 1517 n.6. 
Footnote 4 lists well-known historical figures who published anonymously, such as Mark 
Twain, O. Henry, Voltaire, Benjamin Franklin, George Eliot, George Sand, Charles 
Dickens, and William Shakespeare. Footnote 6 lists prominent Federalist and Anti-
Federalists who published under pseudonyms, including James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, and John Jay ("Publius"), and others whose true identities are still subject to 
speculation, such as "Cato," "Centinel," "The Federal Farmer," "Brutus," and "Junius." 
The Court also cited Justice Black's historical analysis of anonymous political activity in 
Talley v. California. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (Justice Black's defense of 
anonymous speech).  
75. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995). Justice 
Ginsburg's concurring opinion notes that, "We do not hereby hold that the State may not 
in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest by, disclosing its 
identity." Id. Just what these other, larger circumstances might be is anyone's guess. As 
journalist David Broder notes, "The Court deliberately left in doubt whether the same 
ruling would apply if 10,000 or 1 million letters were mailed anonymously on the eve of 
a national election . . . ." David S. Broder, Bungled by the High Court, WASH. POST, 
May 7, 1995, at 7. Although the federal counterpart to Ohio's disclosure statute, 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441d, might be upheld because of its limitation to candidates, Broder's question 
remains valid because the effect of the Court's ruling on the federal statute was not 
addressed in the Court's opinion. This is a glaring omission, especially since the subject 
of the federal disclosure statute did arise during the course of oral argument. See Official 
Transcript, available at WESTLAW 1994 WL 665265.  
The Second Circuit recently had occasion to review the federal disclosure requirement in 
the wake of McIntyre. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285 
(2d Cir. 1995). Here, the defendants were charged under 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) for failing 
to identify their organization in a solicitation letter for donations to be used for political 
causes. Id. at 287. The court upheld the statute as a minimally restrictive method of 
ensuring open electoral competition. Id. at 296. The court reached this conclusion by 
distinguishing McIntyre, holding that the regulation of solicitations for campaign 
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donations is a compelling government interest capable of withstanding strict scrutiny. Id. 
The interests were said to be "more compelling" and the statute "more narrowly tailored." 
Id. at 295.  
76. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1525. Justice Thomas criticized the Majority's reasoning for 
"Fail[ing] to seek the original understanding of the First Amendment." Id. at 1530. Justice 
Thomas went to great lengths in hypothesizing such understanding, and came to the 
conclusion that the "historical evidence from the framing" supports the conclusion that 
the Framers understood anonymous pamphleteering to be protected speech. See id. at 
1525-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
77. Id. at 1530 ("The Court discovers a hitherto unknown right-to-be-unknown while 
engaging in electoral politics."). Ironically, Justice Scalia also based his conclusion on 
ascertaining the "original intent" of the Framers. The fact that he and Justice Thomas 
came to opposite conclusions while employing an original intent analysis plays nicely 
into the hands of critics of the "original intent" school. For further discussion of "original 
intent" analysis, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d Ed. (1988); and Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204 (1980). The foremost advocate of original 
intent theory, former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, answers critics in ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).  
78. See supra note 74.  
79. See supra note 74, and infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.  
80. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.  
81. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.  
82. See infra note 74.  
83. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516-17 (1995) (citing relevant 
portions of Justice Black's analysis of anonymous political speech).  
84. Cf. infra note 31 and accompanying text.  
85. Id.  
86. Brief for Petitioner, at 12-15, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 
(1995) (No. 93-986). See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 30-41.  
87. A syllogism is the full logical form of a single argument. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1449 (6th ed. 1990). "It consists of three propositions (two premises and 
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the conclusion), and these contain three terms, of which the two occurring in the 
conclusion are brought together in the premises by being referred to a common class." Id. 
The syllogism necessarily fails because the constitution did not yet exist when the 
framers engaged in anonymous speech. This is not to say that one can reach the opposite 
conclusion from this syllogism. Rather, it demonstrates that the argument begs the 
question rather than answers it. This argument also fails to consider that many of the 
same legislators who ratified the First Amendment also passed the Sedition Act a short 
time later. See infra note 95.  
88. Brief for Respondent at 30, 31 (citing SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS. 
ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (Forthcoming, 
1995)).  
89. See Editors, B. IIDEP. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1787, reprinted in XIII The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 315 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1981), cited in Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 31 ("[I]t is 
submitted to you, gentlemen, and the other Printers in the State, whether it will be best to 
publish any production, where the author chooses to remain concealed."). See also MASS. 
CENTINEL, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra at 315-16, cited 
in Brief for Respondent, supra note 47, at 32 (requirement of newspaper that all writers 
be willing to identify themselves publicly).  
90. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1531 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
91. Hostilities with England for the most part ceased after the Yorktown campaign in 
1781, and peace with England was formally resolved in 1783. The U.S. Constitution was 
ratified in 1788. Two years later the first ten Amendments were adopted. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1991).  
92. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 71 (1986).  
93. See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS ch. 2 (1985) [hereinafter 
LEVY, A FREE PRESS]. See also LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). 
Levy's earlier work argued that the early American experience with regard to press and 
speech liberties was marked by widespread intolerance by the government. Levy admits 
in his later work that he previously overstated his case. He explains that if one looks at 
American practices instead of American law and theory, there exists not a legacy of 
suppression but a "legacy of liberty." Levy, A Free Press, supra, at ch. 10. See also 
LOUIS FISHER, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ch. 
618-20 (1990).  
94. See Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Ky. 1976) ("[I]t does not seem 
altogether naive to assume that a fundamental objective of the First Amendment was to 
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obviate the necessity for anonymity. Not only is it unnecessary in the conduct of public 
elections, it is repulsive."). See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 40 A.2d 137, 138-39 (PA. 
1944) ("[The disclosure statute] is an attempt to raise the ethical standards of political 
discussion, to promote fair play and fair competition in politics, to banish cowards from 
the political arena . . . .").  
95. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the Sedition Act 
was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court 
of history."). In fact, the Sedition Act expired under its own terms in 1801. 1 Stat. 596 § 
2. President Jefferson thereafter pardoned every person convicted under the Act. FISHER, 
supra note 93, at 620. There is general agreement that the Act was a significant factor in 
leading to the downfall of the Federalist party. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 93; LEVY, 
FREE PRESS, supra note 93; Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious 
Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985) (an excellent overview 
of the law and theory of seditious libel from the sixteenth to early twentieth century).  
96. "The record in this case contains not even a hint that Mrs. McIntyre feared 'threats, 
harassment, or reprisals'; indeed, she placed her name on some of her fliers and meant to 
place it on all of them." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1511, 1535 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Mrs. McIntyre thus sought to vindicate a right she never 
attempted to exercise in the first place. See also supra note 45 (Mrs. McIntyre was a 
prominent figure in the tax levy battle who had little reservation about making her 
presence known.).  
97. See supra note 71 (strict scrutiny applied to Ohio's disclosure statute).  
98. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See infra note 99 (discussing the 
Anderson test).  
99. A court considering a state election law challenge must weigh "the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justification for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to 
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 789. Strict scrutiny also involves "balancing," but the scales are presumptively 
tipped against the state. "[I]t is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives 
strict scrutiny." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). With strict scrutiny, a state 
must demonstrate a "compelling" interest and show that its law affecting a fundamental 
right is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 
(1984). The lesser Anderson standard is more akin to intermediate scrutiny, and presumes 
that the restriction are valid: "[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only 
reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 
'the state's important [not compelling] regulatory interests are generally sufficient of 
justify' the restrictions." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ohio 
1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (emphasis and 
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brackets added)). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 46 (1987) (discussing various classes of speech and standards of review with 
regard to the First Amendment).  
100. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  
101. Burdick v. Tukashi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("[A]s we have recognized when 
those rights are subjected to 'severe restrictions', the regulation must be narrowly drawn 
to advance a State interest of compelling importance."). In Burdick, the Court considered 
a challenge to Hawaii's prohibition against write-in voting. Id. at 430. The Court applied 
the relaxed Anderson standard of review and held that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in 
voting did not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens' rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 432-42. This was despite the Court's prior 
acknowledgment that "[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under out 
constitutional structure." Id. at 433 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers 
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). Although Hawaii effectively eliminated this form of 
political expression, the Court did not view this as a "severe restriction." Id. at 437. See 
also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding statute providing for "campaign 
free zone" within 100 feet of a voting booth on election day).  
102. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. See also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (1992) ("Common 
sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an 
active role in structuring elections."); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("[A]s a 
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair 
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.").  
103. The Petitioner argued that governments have used laws requiring compulsory 
disclosure to subject members of unpopular groups to intimidation, threats, and 
harassment from adversaries. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958), the Court held that compelled disclosure of NAACP membership lists 
violated those persons' rights to freely associate and disseminate their views. Similar 
issues arose in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960) (both cases involving disclosure laws used as a pretext for racial 
discrimination). The rule to be learned from these cases is that laws, which are otherwise 
constitutional on their face, cannot be enforced in such a manner as to violate individuals' 
constitutional rights. It follows, then, that courts can carve exceptions to disclosure laws 
for persons who demonstrate specific facts indicating that disclosure of their identities 
will subject them to harm. Cf. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 
U.S. 87 (1982) (plaintiff exempted from complying with Ohio election statute requiring 
disclosure of campaign contributors because of the history of harassment against Socialist 
party members); Patterson, 357 U.S. 449. The Court could have acknowledged this 
safety mechanism and upheld O.R.C. § 3599.09 in its general application. In fact, such a 
"safety mechanism" is built into O.R.C. § 3599.09. See supra note 57 (statutory provision 
allowing elections commission to enter a finding that "good cause" exists to forgo the 
imposition of a fine or punishment for violation of the disclosure requirement).  
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104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(a) (Anderson 1988). The disclosure statute 
only applies in instances where the speaker seeks to affect the outcome of a candidate or 
issue-based election. Id. It does not require an attribution statement to appear on all types 
of communication. For example, anonymous leaflets circulated in protest of a 
government policy, or directed directly against a government official or officeholder, 
would not be prohibited by the statute. In fact, it would be perfectly permissible to wage 
an anonymous campaign against the disclosure statute itself.  
105. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 ("[E]ven though this provision applies evenhandedly to 
advocates of differing viewpoints, it is a direct regulation on the content of speech.").  
106. Id. The great weight of authority supports the Court's proposition that the statute in 
McIntyre is "content-based," because the statute regulates a certain topic of speech, i.e. 
political speech in support of or in opposition to a candidate or issue. See infra notes 38-
39, 43 (strict scrutiny applied to disclosure statutes, including those states that have 
upheld the statutes). However, this Note argues that a court reviewing a disclosure statute 
should apply a two-pronged test. First, the court should determine whether the statute is 
content-based. If so, the next inquiry should be to determine whether the restriction is 
viewpoint neutral. Arguably, all disclosure statutes will be content-based by their very 
nature because of the activity they seek to regulate (speech concerning a political topic). 
However, if the disclosure statute is viewpoint neutral, the statute should not be subject to 
strict scrutiny. This test shifts the inquiry to whether the challenged restriction burdens a 
persons ability to publicize his or her views, which should be the primary concern of the 
First Amendment. Attribution statements contained in a writing do not impede the ability 
to publish, nor do they censor the substantive content of the message. See infra note 105 
(arguing that the disclosure statute is viewpoint-neutral), and 107 (discussing the 
limitations of the disclosure statute with respect to the class of speech regulated).  
The test advocated above bridges the gap between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions in cases such as McIntrye, where the classification to be given to the speech is 
not entirely clear. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (questioning the content-based/content-neutral distinction and elaborating on 
the parameters of content-based restrictions). For example, Stone defines "content-
neutral" restrictions as those "[L]imit[ing] expression without regard to the content or 
communicative impact of the message conveyed." Stone, supra note 98, at 48. "Content-
based" restrictions "[L]imit communication because of the message it conveys." Id. at 47. 
Examples of a content-based restriction include laws that prohibit seditious libel or ban 
the communication of confidential information. Id. Content-neutral restrictions might 
include laws that restrict noisy speech near a hospital, or laws that limit campaign 
contributions. Id. at 48. The speech at issue in McIntyre is not easily pigeonholed into 
either category. Ohio's disclosure statute operates irrespective of whether the information 
to be anonymously conveyed is true or false, so in that respect it is content-neutral. See 
infra notes 105, 107. On the other hand, the only speech regulated by the statute is that 
which one communicates in support of or in opposition to a candidate or issue, so in this 
respect it is content-based. The two-pronged test outlined above gives effect to the 
general concern of whether speech on an entire topic is encumbered, as well as the 
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specific concern of whether an alleged restriction censors the content of a speaker's 
message.  
107. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518. A content-based restriction on speech occurs where 
restrictions are placed on the espousal of a particular viewpoint, or when there is a 
prohibition of public discourse on an entire topic. Burson, 504 U.S. at 191. See also Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principle inquiry in 
determining content-neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys . . . . Government regulation 
of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech.'"). Ohio's disclosure statute is viewpoint neutral: it does 
not discriminate as to the subject matter of the speech nor the topic of the speaker, nor 
does it censor the speaker's message. See also Stone, supra note 99 (identifying seven 
distinct standards of review the Supreme Court has used in resolving content-neutral 
restrictions on speech).  
108. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) 
(states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of the 
elections process). See also supra notes 101-02 (cases upholding restrictions on speech in 
order to preserve the integrity of the elections process).  
109. It is conceded that attempting to "balance" competing rights is a perilous enterprise, 
because the relative weight to be given to an asserted right is incapable of quantification. 
See generally Stone, supra note 99, at 72 (discussing the inherent difficulty of utilizing a 
balancing approach to claims of Fist Amendment abridgment). The competing interests at 
issue with regard to disclosure statutes are the state's interest in maintaining the integrity 
of elections versus an individual's (asserted) right to disseminate anonymous political 
literature. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing the tension between 
these interests). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the long acknowledged 
right of states regarding elections regulation outweighs the right to anonymous speech, 
especially since a major tenant of the First Amendment was to obviate the need for 
anonymity. See supra note 94, and infra note 116 (questioning the need to protect 
anonymous speech in light of the protections afforded by the First Amendment).  
It should also be noted that a majority of states have chosen to enact disclosure statutes. 
See supra notes 9, 36. This provides additional evidence that the interest being protected 
by the statutes is in fact compelling. Cf. Burson , 504 U.S. at 191 (citing the fact that all 
50 states have laws similar to the one being challenged as evidence that the interests 
advanced by the state are compelling).  
110. That disclosure statutes are related to the advancement of the state interest to be 
protected is not disputed. What is disputed is whether disclosure statutes are sufficiently 
tailored to advance the state's interest, without infringing on other protected rights. See 
supra note 73 and accompanying text (Court's overbreadth analysis).  
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A state should also be able to enact a disclosure statute without demonstrating that it has 
experienced problems of voter fraud or misinformation campaigns in the past. Cf. Munro 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). In Munro, the Court upheld a 
Washington statute requiring minor candidates to obtain 1% of all votes cast for that 
office in the state's primary election before the candidates name could appear on the 
general ballot. Id. at 190-99. The basis for the law stemmed from Washington's fear of 
"voter confusion and ballot overcrowding." Id. at 194. However, Washington never 
demonstrated that these fears had in fact materialized. The Court upheld the statute 
nonetheless. "Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential 
deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that 
the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally 
protected rights." Id. at 195-96.  
111. Theoretically, a state could adopt a disclosure statute that only requires an 
attribution statement where the content of the message is false, misleading, or libelous. 
See King, supra note 7. However, the prevention of fraud, false advertising, and libel are 
not the only interests at issue; the state also has an interest in ensuring that the electorate 
has access to relevant information in order to make informed decisions. See infra notes 
113-14 and accompanying text (arguing that the informational interest served by the 
disclosure statute is "compelling"). A disclosure requirement directly serves this interest. 
Moreover, Ohio's disclosure statute is an aid to enforcement of a related statute that 
prohibits the dissemination of knowingly false information. Without the disclosure 
statute, enforcement of the statute prohibiting false statements would be difficult, if not 
impossible. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1511, 1536 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting ) (explaining why a prohibition against making false statements is meaningless 
without a corresponding enforcement mechanism).  
112. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520 ("Ohio's informational interest is plainly insufficient to 
support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement."). Accord People v. White, 506 
N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987) (rejecting the argument that ensuring an informed electorate is a 
sufficient interest to support a disclosure statute). But see infra note 101-02 (discussing 
cases recognizing an informational interest with respect to elections laws).  
113. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding disclosure 
requirement for lobbyists as imposing only a modest burden on First Amendment rights 
without regulating the content of the speech). Moreover, the modest burdens are 
outweighed by the state interest in "maintain[ing] the integrity of a basic governmental 
process." Id.; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) 
("Corporate advertising . . . is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the source of 
advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that people will be able to 
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1 (1976) (upholding portions of the Federal Elections Campaign Act mandating 
disclosure of campaign contributors). The McIntyre Court distinguished Buckley and 
Belotti on the basis that neither dealt with the distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522-23.  
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In Burson, 504 U.S. at 211, the Court upheld a Tennessee statute prohibiting the 
distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of any voting booth on election day. 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the ban based on Tennessee's compelling 
interest in "[P]rotecting voters from confusion and undue influence." Id. at 14. This raises 
an interesting question: Had Mrs. McIntrye been in Tennessee and distributed her 
anonymous flyers within 100 feet of a voting booth, would her speech have lost its 
protected status? For cases contra to the proposition that the First Amendment should 
serve an informational interest, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) 
(First Amendment protection is not dependent on the "truth, popularity, or social utility of 
the ideas and beliefs which are offered."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) 
("The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority for assuming 
a guardianship of the public mind. . . . [T]he forefathers did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us."); accord Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419 
(1988) (citing Thomas and Button).  
114. See generally James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral 
Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 892 
(1984) ("A central though rarely articulated premise of many election laws and much 
democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be rational rather than irrational that 
they should reflect the true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people."). Cf. Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). "[I]t has been recognized that a State has a 
compelling interest in ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by 
fraud in the election process." Id. at 200-05 (discussing the problems associated with 
elections fraud since the inception of the paper ballot in American electoral politics).  
115. Gardner, supra note 114, at 936.  
116. See supra notes 3-6. See also Canon v. Justice Ct., 393 P.2d 428, 459 (Cal. 1964) 
("[A]nonymity all too often lends itself, in the context of attacks upon candidates in the 
preelection period, to smears, as a result of which the electorate is deceived. 
Identification permits confrontation and often makes refutation easier and more effective. 
It tends to reduce irresponsibility. It enables the public to appraise the source."). See also 
infra note 117 (comments regarding "gutter politics").  
117. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21 
CAP. U. L. REV. 575, 575-78 (1992) (discussing negative political advertising during 
1988 presidential elections); Lance Conn, Comment, Mississippi Mudslinging: The 
Search for Truth in Political Advertising, 63 MISS. L.J. 507, pts. II-III (1994) (discussing 
the problems of negative political advertising in Mississippi, but arguing that state 
regulation of such speech would run afoul of the First Amendment); Peter F. May, Note, 
State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive 
Negative Attacks, 72 B. U. L. REV. 179, 181-91, (1992) (explaining the widespread use 
of negative political advertising in Massachusetts); David S. Broder, Politicians, Advisers 
Agonize Over Negative Campaigning; Success of Tactics Discourages Policing, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 19, 1989, at A1 (discussing negative campaigning and how politicians and 
political advisors view it as a "necessary evil"); Bill Kirtz, How to Handle Negative Ads , 
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BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 9, 1992, available at WESTLAW 1992 WL 3391959 
(recommending that television networks "recap" false political advertisements to alleviate 
voter confusion: "Displace false content and hold the bums accountable."); Alexandra 
Marks, Backlash Grows Against Negative Political Ads, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
Sept. 28, 1995 (general overview of public sentiment against negative advertising, with 
related commentary on why such advertising is effective); Matt Truell, House Advances 
Ethics Bill, ASSOC. PRESS POLITICAL SERV., Mar. 24, 1993, available at WESTLAW 
1993 WL 5587563 (quoting Kansas state congressman Tom Sawyer, D-Wichita, as 
stating "Our campaigns have continually gotten dirtier, and the public has gotten tired of 
dirty campaigns."). See also supra notes 94, 116 (anonymity used as a shield by those 
wishing to take advantage of the electoral process), and 36 (explaining that a majority of 
states have some type of disclosure statute in order to maintain the integrity of the 
elections process).  
118. See, e.g., supra note 36 (discussing the fact that most states have some type of 
disclosure statute). See also Gardner, supra note 114 (discussing the need for rational 
election outcomes); supra note 117 (discontent with modern election tactics).  
119. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1533 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). See also supra note 109 (arguing that the widespread use of disclosure 
statutes is indicative of the compelling interest served by regulation of anonymous 
campaign literature, which should assist a disclosure statute in meeting the strict scrutiny 
standard of review).  
120. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-21.  
121. Id. at 1520 ("As this case demonstrates, the prohibition encompasses documents that 
are not even arguably false or misleading."). This critique might be more persuasive were 
it not for Ohio's related interest in providing the electorate with relevant information. 
This interest, though related to the issue of false and misleading information, is a separate 
and distinct issue. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining the importance 
of ensuring that voters have access to relevant information).  
122. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522. But see supra note 111 (arguing that a more limited 
disclosure requirement would not be effective in identifying those persons who engage in 
activity legitimately prohibited by the state, i.e. fraud, false advertising, and libel).  
123. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.  
124 See infra notes 101-02, 108 (cases explaining the importance of regulating the 
elections process).  
125. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 11, 12 (arguing that the disclosure 
statute is a necessary aid to enforcement of the prohibition against making knowingly 
false statements). See also infra note 111 (explaining that a prohibition against making 
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false statements is useless without an enforcement mechanism such as a disclosure 
statute).  
126. See infra Part IV (B).  
127. Id.  
128. See Part IV (C).  
129. See Part IV (C)(1).  
130. See Part IV (C)(2).  
131. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
See also supra note 75 (discussing the holding of this case and the rationale used to 
distinguish it from McIntyre). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 
1511, 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] whole new boutique of wonderful First 
Amendment litigation opens its doors.").  
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